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BACKGROUND: Pay-for-performance is proliferating,
yet its impact on key stakeholders remains uncertain.
OBJECTIVE: The Society of General Internal Medicine
systematically evaluated ethical issues raised by per-
formance-based physician compensation.
RESULTS: We conclude that current arrangements are
based on fundamentally acceptable ethical principles,
but are guided by an incomplete understanding of
health-care quality. Furthermore, their implementation
without evidence of safety and efficacy is ethically
precarious because of potential risks to stakeholders,
especially vulnerable patients.
CONCLUSION: We propose four major strategies to tran-
sition from risky pay-for-performance systems to ethical
performance-based physician compensation and high
qualitycare.Theseincludeimplementingsafeguardswithin
current pay-for-performance systems, reaching consensus
regarding the obligations of key stakeholders in improving
health-care quality, developing valid and comprehensive
measures of health-care quality, and utilizing a cautious
evaluative approach in creating the next generation of
compensation systems that reward genuine quality.
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P
ay-for-performance systems seek to improve health-care
quality by providing bonus dollars to physicians, practice
groups, or hospitals whose patients achieve certain health
goals.
1 These arrangements are proliferating, yet their impact
on key stakeholders remains uncertain.
2–7 The Society of
General Internal Medicine (SGIM), through its Ethics Commit-
tee, systematically evaluated ethical issues raised by perfor-
mance-based physician compensation. Investigations included
literature review, in-depth interviews with key informants,
focus groups among SGIM members, open forums at national
SGIM meetings, and discussions among SGIM committees and
leadership. A comprehensive report of the Ethics Committee’s
findings and recommendations is available at http://www.
sgim.org/index.cfm?pageId=806.
8
This position paper begins by examining the fundamental
principles of pay-for-performance and setting forth our organi-
zation’s definition of health-care quality. Based on this explora-
tion, we present our conclusions regarding the manner of
implementation of pay-for-performance and its potential effects
on key stakeholders. We propose four major strategies for
moving toward more ethical and effective performance-based
physician compensation, emphasizing the need to implement




The fundamental principles of pay-for-performance include
rewarding quality health care and aligning physicians’ finan-
cial incentives with the best interests of patients.
9 Although
this inherent appeal to physician self-interest might be in
tension with professional ideals of altruism and benefi-
cence,
10–13 the principles that inform pay-for-performance
are not inherently unethical. It seems just, for example, to
financially reward physicians who demonstrate outstanding
levels of patient-centered and evidence-based care.
Nevertheless, systems intending to improve medical care
must be guided by evidence and a precise definition of health-
care quality to ensure that they are effective, valid, and fair. We
define health-care quality in a manner that prioritizes patient-
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854centered care
14 while recognizing the importance of popula-
tion-level health improvement:
15
Health-care quality is the degree to which physicians
and health-care institutions fulfill their care obligations
to individual patients and the degree to which patients,
physicians, and health-care institutions enable these
obligations to be fulfilled justly across the population.
16
This understanding of health-care quality informs our
criticisms of current pay-for-performance arrangements and
provides a roadmap to high quality care and ethical perfor-
mance-based physician compensation.
Potential Ethical Problems in the Implementation
of Pay-for-Performance
In light of these principles, we see the following potential
ethical problems in the implementation of pay-for-performance
systems.
1. Lack of proven safety and benefit for patients: Studies of
performance-based physician compensation have gener-
ally shown scant evidence of quality improvement.
2–7
Implementation without proof of safety and effectiveness is
ethically problematic. It is unclear, for instance, why a new
drugtobeusedbyseveraldozenindividualsrequiresproofof
safety and efficacy, while policy changes affecting millions do
not. From an ethical perspective, pay-for-performance is a
potentially risky experiment in health-care delivery.
17 Fur-
ther, current pay-for-performance systems generally lack
key safeguards against readily anticipated adverse effects
1
(discussed below), and we are concerned that negative
outcomes may already be unfolding.
2. Inadequate definitions of quality: Although commentators
have proposed many definitions of health-care quality,
18–27
none are universally accepted, and they provide little
guidance regarding accountability or how quality can be val-
idly measured. Furthermore, current pay-for-performance
arrangements are guided by a highly incomplete under-
standing of quality that does not resemble any published or
well-reasoned definition. This understanding typically
equates quality with the achievement of non-individualized,
pre-determined health goals for broad populations and fails
to consider contributions from stakeholders other than
physician entities
1 (such as health plans) that also have
partial responsibility for ensuring quality. This approach has
severely limited our ability to capture the myriad of
elements comprising quality care, let alone the most
complex but essential feature of a praxis like medicine—
the exercise of correct judgment—which is only readily
assessed by peers.
28
3. Inadequate measures of quality: Because they are based
on inadequate definitions, existing pay-for-performance
measures lack validity and comprehensiveness in asses-
sing health-care quality. Measures typically cover only
isolated and readily quantifiable aspects of physician
clinical performance and fail to assess crucial realms such
as judgment, compassion, and communication skills.
Quantifying health-care quality is notoriously difficult, and
basing payment incentives upon inadequate measures and
definitions of quality will make consequences difficult to
control. Unfortunately, this approach is often used to make
judgments about individual practitioners when variability in
case mix and patient preferences precludes making valid
judgments. For example, in a patient with difficult-to-control
diabetes, a decline in hemoglobin A1C from 10.0 to 8.0 might
be a remarkable achievement and more validly represent high
quality care than a decline from 7.3 to 6.9 in another patient.
4. Misallocating the locus of accountability for quality improve-
ment: Many pay-for-performance measures hold physi-
cians accountable for aspects of quality beyond their
control, such as health-care delivery problems, lack of
incentives for coordinated care, and even social determi-
nants of health. Some may hold physicians accountable
for the care of patients with whom they have not had a
continuous relationship.
5. Potential for adverse effects on patients and vulnerable
populations: Performance targets used today may have
detrimental effects on quality. For example, it may seem
reasonable to require that diabetic patients achieve
hemoglobin A1C levels below 7.0. In patients with
previous hypoglycemic episodes, however, this target
might be life-threatening.
Or, consider a patient with a hemoglobin A1C of 7.5 who
frequently skips preventive visits but happens to present with
back pain. If bonuses are provided for reducing glucose levels,
a physician might prefer to discuss diabetes control rather
than ruling out life-threatening causes of back pain. Such
“treating the measure” might worsen outcomes.
Pre-determined population-centered measures might also
induce physicians to avoid patients who are less likely to meet
targets. Such patients are often society’s most vulnerable
members—those with multiple chronic conditions, the poor,
the educationally disadvantaged, those with limited English
proficiency, and members of racial minority groups.
Because physicians serving disadvantaged patients might
receive lower compensation, less well-off practices would be left
with fewer resources to improve care. This could create a vicious
cycle of worsening quality for the most vulnerable patients.
Poorly designed pay-for-performance systems could there-
fore limit access to care for vulnerable populations, worsen
health-care quality, and erode patient trust.
29–38
6. Potential for adverse effects on physicians: In systems using
a limited set of population-level measures, physician profes-
sionalism and morale could decline. Some clinicians might
“treat the measure” or select the “best” patients to enhance
income. Others might provide optimal care despite reduced
income, but grow frustrated. Pay-for-performance is also
likely to increase the complexity of the reimbursement
system, and metrics might be used against physicians for
legal, credentialing, or recertification purposes. Such
changes would decrease physician job satisfaction, with
detrimental effects on patient care and the attractiveness of
medicine (especially primary care) as a profession.
7. Potential for adverse effects on society: The potential
detrimental effects above would have broader implications
for society. A decreasing supply of primary care physicians
would exacerbate problems in access and quality. Truly
valid and comprehensive measurements might require
overly burdensome or expensive systems, and could make
855 Wharam et al.: Quality Care and Ethical Pay-for-Performance JGIMthe marginal value of performance-based compensation
negligible. Deteriorating value could also result if physi-
cians drive up expenses by ordering unnecessary tests or
referrals to specialists.
36
Ultimately, insurers could face a backlash by patients and
physicians against an effort that might be viewed cynically as
another cost-containment attempt, offered disingenuously as
quality improvement.
8. Lack of structured monitoring for adverse outcomes: A
substantial literature advocates structured oversight of
any risky intervention not meant to directly benefit
individuals.
39–53 Although pay-for-performance is
intended to improve patient care, some would argue that
it is primarily a population-centered cost control measure
with unclear effectiveness and a substantial risk-benefit
ratio for certain populations.
33 We believe the risks from
pay-for-performance outlined above are serious enough
and have a high enough probability of occurring to
engender an ethical obligation for structured monitoring
of key outcomes (discussed below).
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
SGIM supports evidence-based, ethical, and comprehensive
efforts to improve health-care quality and physician compensa-
tion. While carefully designed pay-for-performance systems
could be a component of such an approach, current iterations
fail to reach acceptable ethical standards for the reasons above.
We therefore advocate the following four major strategies to
achieve high quality health care and ethical performance-based
physician compensation (Tables 1, 2, 3).
Current Pay-for-Performance Systems
should Rapidly Adopt Safeguards to Protect
Vulnerable Populations
Until researchers develop valid and comprehensive quality
measures, pay-for-performance systems must prioritize the
protection of vulnerable populations and minimize readily an-
ticipated adverse consequences (Table 3). Pay-for-performance
leaders should institute the following safeguards to achieve
these aims:
1. Balance current population-level measurements with the
best available measures of quality from the patient per-
spective. The non-patient-centered nature of current pay-
for-performance systems could be partially remedied by
appropriate measures. For example, the Consumer Assess-
ment of Healthcare Providers
54 places a strong emphasis on
measuring how well health-care providers communicate
with patients. A growing body of research
55,56 could inform
the development of valid measures in the outpatient setting.
2. Reduce or stabilize the percentage of physicians’ salaries at
stake. Policy makers should limit bonus amounts to
reduce temptations to “game” the system, especially in
arrangements that do not adjust for case mix. Current
levels of approximately 5% of physicians’ salaries seem
reasonable in systems that adjust for case mix, while lower
levels would be appropriate for those that do not.
3. Provide adequate off-setting compensation to physicians
serving vulnerable patients. For example, the 2006 Mas-
sachusetts health-care reform legislation included provi-
sions to base Medicaid hospital rate increases on quality
improvement, including the reduction of health-care dis-
Table 1. Potential Ethical Problems in the Implementation of Pay-
for-Performance
I. Lack of proven safety and benefit for patients
II. Inadequate definitions of quality
III. Inadequate measures of quality
IV. Misallocating the locus of accountability for quality improvement
V. Potential for adverse effects on patients and vulnerable populations
VI. Potential for adverse effects on physicians
VII. Potential for adverse effects on society
VIII. Lack of structured monitoring for adverse outcomes
Table 2. Major Strategies to Achieve High Quality Health Care and
Ethical Performance-Based Physician Compensation
I. Current pay-for-performance systems should rapidly adopt
safeguards to protect vulnerable populations (see Table 3)
II. Key stakeholders should develop consensus regarding their
responsibilities in improving health-care quality
III. Researchers and policy makers should develop valid and
comprehensive quality measures for use in the next generation of
compensation systems that reward genuine quality
IV. Researchers and policy makers should use a cautious evaluative
approach to long-term development of compensation systems that
reward quality
Table 3. Recommended Safeguards to Protect Vulnerable
Populations and Prevent Unintended Consequences Within Current
Pay-for-Performance Systems
1. Balance current population-level measurements with the best
available measures of quality from the patient perspective
2. Reduce or stabilize the percentage of physicians’ salaries at stake
(except as in point 3 below)
3. Provide adequate off-setting compensation for physicians serving
vulnerable patients
4. Population-level measures should:
a. Be evidence-based and clearly linked to valued patient outcomes
b. Assess domains clearly within the influence of the physician or
physician group, especially for complex patients
c. Assess quality at the level of large physician practices rather than
individual physicians
d. Assess improvement toward goals in addition to achievement of
cut-points
5. If systems utilize population-level outcomes measures, they should:
a. Explicitly assess patient complexity and vulnerability
b. Carefully adjust for case-mix based on relevant patient factors
c. Carefully adjust for the manner in which responsibility for patient
outcomes is shared between physicians, patients, health plans, and
other health-care institutions
6. Initiate monitoring before and after implementing the above changes.
Monitoring should assess:
a. Patient satisfaction, access, continuity, and coordination of care;
effects on vulnerable patients as a particularly important focus
b. Physician satisfaction and professionalism, administrative burden,
effects on the patient-physician relationship
c. Effects on disparities between physician practices serving vulnerable
and non-vulnerable populations
d. Payer satisfaction and value for health-care expenditures
856 Wharam et al.: Quality Care and Ethical Pay-for-Performance JGIMparities.
57 If such provisions are designed meticulously
and fairly,
58 financial incentives could encourage and
reward physicians for serving patients with low levels of
expendable income, complex medical conditions, non-
adherence to recommended treatments, or limited health
literacy.
4. Recommendations regarding population-level measures.
Pre-determined population-level measures of quality must
be instituted carefully because they are inherently non-
patient-centered. Because such measures are pervasive in
modern pay-for-performance systems, we recommend
several strategies to maximize the protection of vulnerable
patients:
4.a. Utilize population-level measures that are evidence-
based and clearly linked to valued patient outcomes.
For example, pneumonia and influenza immuniza-
tions have been proven to prevent potentially debil-
itating illnesses while having minimal adverse
effects. Other commonly utilized measures may fail
to reach these standards; hemoglobin A1C targets
are based on evidence from randomized control
trials, but the applicability to individual patients on
real-life physician panels is often unclear.
35,59
4.b. Population-level measures should assess domains
clearly within the influence of the physician or
physician group, especially for complex patients.
Basic process measures, such as vaccination rates
and the frequency of diabetic eye exams, are imper-
fect measures of quality, but are more within the
influence of physicians and practice groups than
outcomes measures. Process measures seem less
likely than outcomes measures to cause avoidance
of vulnerable patients and physician frustration.
4.c. Measures should assess quality at the level of large
physician practices rather than individual physicians.
Experts skilled in statistical analysis should deter-
mine minimum patient population sizes for each
measure to provide optimal data and avoid statisti-
cal error. Only practice groups with sufficient num-
bers of patients should initially be measured.
4.d. Measures should assess improvement toward goals
in addition to achievement of cut-points. This could
apply to both process and outcomes measures. For
example, physician groups could be rewarded both
for achieving vaccination rates at a pre-determined
level as well as for annual improvements toward the
target.
5. Recommendations regarding population-level outcomes
measures. Population-level outcomes measures are meth-
odologically complex, and the validity of current measures
is uncertain. This will likely preclude their use in an
ethically defensible manner in the short-term unless
provisions that maximize validity are closely followed,
including:
5.a. Explicitly assess patient complexity and vulnerability.
This would require integrating patient survey data
and medical record data regarding sociodemographic
characteristics and medical comorbidities.
5.b. Carefully adjust forcase-mix based on relevant patient
factors. For example, it would be inappropriate to
reduce systolicbloodpressurelevelsbelow140mmHg
in an 85-year-old diabetic patient with multiple co-
morbidities taking three antihypertensive medica-
tions. Proper case-mix adjustment might allow this
patient’s physician to prioritize other care, while a
lack of adjustment could induce either dangerous
efforts to lower blood pressure or substantial
physician frustration.
5.c. Carefully adjust for the manner in which responsibil-
ity for patient outcomes is shared between physi-
cians, patients, health plans, and other health-care
institutions. For example, consider two physicians
who must eventually prescribe three hypoglycemic
medications to similar diabetic patients whose
initial hemoglobin A1C levels were 9.5. The first
patient has generous health insurance, enabling
him to purchase all three medications and lower his
hemoglobin A1C to 6.5. The second patient must
pay the full cost of medications, and she can only
afford two. She only lowers her hemoglobin A1C to
7.5. A proper system would adjust for health
insurance status.
6. Pay-for-performance leaders should initiate monitoring
before and after implementing the above changes. Moni-
toring should assess important patient outcomes not often
included in pay-for performance studies, such as satisfac-
tion, access, continuity, and coordination of care. Effects
on vulnerable patients should be a particularly important
focus. Studies should also assess physician satisfaction
and professionalism, administrative burden, effects on
the patient-physician relationship, and the impact on
disparities between physician practices serving more
vulnerable and less vulnerable populations. Monitoring
should examine payer satisfaction and value for health-
care expenditures.
Key Stakeholders should Develop Consensus
Regarding their Responsibilities in Improving
Health Care Quality
A crucial first step in achieving ethically defensible health-care
quality improvement will be for key stakeholders to develop
consensus regarding their shared and unique obligations to
individual patients and patient populations. For example, to
improve blood glucose control among diabetic patients, physi-
cians must recommend evidence-based, patient-centered
management strategies, practice groups must provide access
to testing facilities, health insurers must facilitate receipt of
affordable medications and testing, and patients must adhere
to therapeutic plans.
Bringing health insurers, patients, employers, and physi-
cians to the table would highlight opportunities to improve
coordination and continuity of care; new paradigms for quality
improvement that integrate assessment at the individual
physician level and institution level could emerge.
857 Wharam et al.: Quality Care and Ethical Pay-for-Performance JGIMResearchers and Policy Makers should Develop
Valid and Comprehensive Quality Measures
for Use in the Next Generation of Compensation
Systems that Reward Genuine Quality
A long-term strategy for quality improvement will be guided by
a framework of accountability in which physicians, practice
groups, health plans, and public payers are measured based
on how well they fulfill well-defined obligations to individual
patients and populations.
For example, measures of physician quality should assess
multiple domains, such as accessibility, adherence to evi-
dence-based but patient-centered care, and communication
skills. Appropriate measures would account for individualized
patient-physician goals, be based on the best available evi-
dence, and minimize administrative burden and expense.
Measures of health-care institution quality (e.g., physician
groups, hospitals, and public and private payers) should
assess domains such as how well these groups foster team-
work, facilitate achievement of patient goals, strengthen the
doctor-patient relationship, and improve access, coordination,
and continuity of care for individual patients.
Equally important will be development of valid population-
level health-care quality measures. In addition to measuring
how well physicians and health-care institutions fulfill obliga-
tions to individual patients, comprehensive quality measures
would assess the degree to which patients, physicians, and
health-care institutions maximize health-care resources avail-
able to the population, distribute them fairly,
60 and fulfill their
obligations justly.
Measures should be developed under strict principles of
transparency. For example, all persons involved in creating
new measures should, at minimum, be required to state
potential conflicts of interest.
Researchers and Policy Makers Should Use
a Cautious Evaluative Approach to Long-Term
Development of Compensation Systems
that Reward Quality
After developing evidence-based measures of physician, health-
care institution, and population-level quality, policy makers
should implement carefully planned, small-scale pilot programs
that reward physician and health-care institution quality.
Benefits and adverse effects should be monitored. Those entities
implementing innovations in payment and quality improvement
should take the lead in funding these studies.
Even with results from well-designed studies, judgments
about the ethics of pay-for-performance will remain challeng-
ing. One approach might be to give preferential consideration
to outcomes among vulnerable patients.
We base our suggestion to begin with pilot programs upon
an ethical principle of precaution. However, efforts should be
scaled up if benefits prove sufficient, health disparities are
reduced and adverse outcomes are minimized.
THE ROLE OF SGIM
In order to aid in the above processes, SGIM is committed to
having general internists participate in articulating the qual-
ity-related obligations that physicians and health-care institu-
tions have to patients and the population. SGIM encourages its
members to take the following actions: (1) help develop
measures of physician, health-care institution, and popula-
tion-level health-care quality, (2) evaluate pay-for-performance
measures and programs, and (3) participate in the ongoing
monitoring of effects of pay-for-performance on vulnerable
populations and physicians. SGIM will continue to develop
collaborative alliances with other key national organizations to
ensure fair, valid, and comprehensive measures and to
promote ethical compensation reform.
CONCLUSIONS
Performance-based physician compensation, if carefully guided
by a comprehensive understanding of health-care quality and
evidence-based evaluations, might improve patient care, narrow
health disparities, and promote fair physician compensation
while increasing health-care value. If research and monitoring
determine that improved payment systems can benefit patients,
physicians, and payers while minimizing risks, they could be
ethical arrangements. However, until such data are available,
widespread expansion of untested pay-for-performance systems
poses substantive ethical issues associated with potential harm
to patients, clinicians, and organizations.
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